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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NATIONAL
ANTI-POLL TAX BILLS
JANICE E. CHRISTENSEN*
V ITAL constitutional issues are posed by the anti-poll tax bills
debated in Congress during the past decade. These bills seek
to abolish the requirement now prevailing in seven southern states
that a poll taxi of one to two dollars be paid before voting in
national elections.2 In providing for the abolition of the poll tax
requirement for voting, the bills raise the broad constitutional issue
of the relative powers of the nation and states in national elections
under our federal system. The issue is raised primarily because the
bills propose to broaden national control of voting qualifications
and requirements hitherto largely within the province of the states.
That unprecedented national control is envisaged is indicated by
*Instructor in Government, University of Texas. Author of The Con-
stitutionality of Proposed National Legislation to Abolish the Poll Tax as a
Requirement for Voting in National Elections. (Thesis on file in University
of Minnesota Library, 1946.)
1. The poll tax (also "capitation" or "head" tax) is a uniform, direct,
and personal tax levied upon the person, head, or poll as the object of taxa-
tion. See Shoup, Poll Tax, 12 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 227 (1933), Dewey, The Poll
Tax 2 Cyc. American Government 732 (1914) , Lutz, Public Finance 454 (2d
ed. 1930) ; Cooley, The Law of Taxation 18 (1879).
2. (a) Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia require payment of a poll tax of one to two dollars be-
fore voting in national and other elections with the exception of primaries in
South Carolina. In three states the tax is cumulative. In Alabama a tax of
$36.00 may be required of an intending voter inasmuch as the tax is cumula-
tive for the entire period of liability; in Mississippi, a tax of $6.00 may be
required at the end of two years; and in Virginia, one of $5.01 may be re-
qtured at the end of three years. Library of Congress, Legislative Reference
Service, Bulletin No. 15, The Poll Tax as a Prerequisite to Voting, Outline
of Legal Provs.ons 1-16 (1942).
(b) The constitutional and statutory provisions making payment of
the poll tax a requirement for voting are cited in Kallenbach, Constitutional
Aspects of Federal Anti-Poll Tax Legislation, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 717 (1947).
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the fact that the bills, if passed, would for the first tiime" abolish
by Congressional action alone a voting requirement established
as a voting qualification in state constitutions. In the past, amend-
ment of the national Constitution rather than statutory action by
Congress has been employed when the national government has
sought to remove qualifications prescribed in state constitutions.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The first anti-poll tax bill was introduced on August 5, 1939,
during the first session of the seventy-sixth Congress by Repre-
sentative Lee S. Geyer, Democrat, of California, at the request
of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare.4 Although hear-
ings were held on the bill before a special subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee, the bill died in committeeY
Geyer's anti-poll tax bill, H.R. 7534, "A Bill to Amend an
Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities," was a proposed
amendment to the First Hatch Act.0 As this might suggest, the
bill was based entirely on the assumption that the poll tax require-
ment resulted in fraudulent political practices at the polls. In the
bill it was stated that "frequently such taxes are paid for the voters
by other persons as an inducement for voting for certain candi-
dates." "Existing legislation prohibiting the making of expendi-
tures to induce persons to vote for certain candidates has failed
to prevent this practice." Congress must, therefore, abolish the
poll tax requirement "in order to insure the honesty" of elections
for national officers, i.e., President, Vice President, or electors for
President or Vice President, Senator, or member of the House of
Representatives of the United States. Inasmuch as Congressional
3. Congress has passed legislation suspending the poll tax requircment
for voting and the requirement of presence at the polls for members of the
armed forces "at time of war." See Act of Sept. 16, 1942, 56 Stat. 753 (1942),
as amended, 58 Stat. 136 (1944), 50 U. S. C. 302 (1946) But this action
would not appear to be identical with abolishing outright a requirement
prescribed as a voting qualification in state constitutions as is the intention
of the anti-poll tax bills.
4. 84 Cong. Rec. 11229 (1939). The Southern Conference of Human
Welfare describes itself as "an organization of representative southerners
interested in improving the social, educational, agricultural, and industrial
conditions in the South." American Council on Public Affairs and Southern
Conference for Human Welfare, The Poll Tax 2 (1940).
The Southern Conference for Human Welfare was responsible for be-
ginning in 1938 agitation for national action to eliminate the poll tax require-
ment in the poll tax states. Foreman, Georgia Kills the Poll Tax, 112 New
Republic 291 (February 26, 1945)
5. The proceedings of the Hearings were not published.
6. H.R. 7534, 76th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1939) "A Bill to Amend an Act
to prevent pernicious political activities."
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power over primaries had been denied by court interpretationj
the bills did not attempt to abolish the poll tax requirement in
primaries.
Geyer introduced the same bill in the seventy-seventh Congress
in 1941.' The bill, now H.R. 1024, was passed by the House of
Representatives on October 12, 1942, by a vote of 252-84.1 In the
Senate, this bill was completely amended by the substitution of
S. 1280, the anti-poll tax bill introduced by Senator Claude Pepper,
Democrat, of Florida, in the same seventy-seventh Congress.'0
Pepper's bill was recommended to pass by the Senate Judiciary
Committee,1 but filibustering tactics of the southern Senators and
failure to invoke cloture prevented the bill from coming to a vote
on the floor of the Senate.12
The Pepper bill 3 differed in important respects from the Geyer
bills. It was not an amendment to the Hatch Act, although it did
state that fraudulent practices resulted from the poll tax require-
ment for voting. But the Pepper bill was based principally on the
contention that the poll tax requirement "is not and shall not be
deemed a qualification of voters or electors within the meaning
of section 2 of article I of the Constitution." The poll tax require-
ment, read the preamble to the bill, bears "no reasonable relation
to the intelligence, ability, character, wealth, community-conscious-
ness or other qualification of voters." Rather, the requirement is
an interference,-with the manner of holding elections, and a tax
7. Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 (1921), overruled it United
-States v. Clas'sic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
8. 87 Cong.-Rtc. 18 (1941).
9. 8g Cong. Rec" 8174 (1942).
10. 87 Cong. Rec. 2698 (1941).
11. 88 Cong. Rec. 8656 (1942).
12. Id. at 9065-72.
13. The preamble of the Pepper bill read m part as follows. "Whereas
the [poll'tax] re4uirements ... have deprived many citizens of the right and
privilege of voting as guaranteed to them under the Constitution, and have
been detrimental to the integrity of the ballot in that frequently such taxes
have been paid for the voters by other persons as an inducement for voting
for certain candidates, and Whereas these requirements have no relation to
the intelligence, ability, character, wealth, community-consciousness or other
qualifications of -voters; and Whereas such requirements do deprive many
citizens of the right and privilege of voting for national officers, and cause,
induce, and abet practices and methods in respect to the holding of primaries
and elections detrimental to the proper selection of persons for national
offices.. ." Section 1 of the bill provided that the poll tax requirement is not
a qualification but an interference with the manner of holding elections and a
tax on the right to vote. Sections 2, 3, and 4 provided that it %as unlawful
for any State or other government subdivision or any person to require poll
'tax payment before voting in national elections or primaries preceding those
elections. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on
S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, 1-2. (1942).
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upon the right to vote. Also, it denies to many citizens the right
and privilege of voting in national elections, including primaries,
a right and privilege guaranteed to them by the Constitution.
In 1943 in the seventy-eighth Congress 14 and in 1945 in the
seventy-ninth Congress15 the most important anti-poll tax bill,
H.R. 7, was introduced by Representative Vito Marcantonio,
American Labor Party, of New York. This bill was passed by the
House of Representatives, May 25, 1943,10 and again on June 12,
1945,17 but it died in the Senate in both Congresses.18
H.R. 7 was identical with the four sections of the Pepper bill
proper, but it did not contain the preamble to the Pepper bill."'
The absence of the preamble to the Pepper bill is of some conse-
quence. It meant that, unlike the Pepper bill, H.R. 7 did not spe-
cifically mention corrupt practices, although they might be imlplied
from the phrase, "an interference with the manner of holding elec-
tions." Also, unlike the Pepper bill, H.R. 7 made no specific refer-
ence to the dissimilarity between the poll tax requirement and
enumerated qualifications of voters. Furthermore, H.R. 7 did not
emphasize in the same way as S. 1280 the deprivation of the citi-
zen's natural right to vote. However, like the Pepper bill, 1.R. 7
was grounded on the assumption that the poll tax requirement is
not a qualification for voting but an interference with the manner
of holding elections and a tax on the right to vote.
In the first session of the eightieth Congress in 1947, H.R. 7,
although introduced again by Marcantonio,20 was replaced by H.R.
29, the anti-poll tax bill introduced by George Bender, Republican,
of Ohio,2 1 as the anti-poll tax bill singled out for passage by the
House of Representatives. H.R. 29, identical with H.R. 7, passed
the House, July 12, 1947,22 but the Senate for the fourth time
failed to pass the anti-poll tax bill sent to it from the House.
It is of interest that in Congress agitation for anti-poll tax
14. 89 Cong. Rec. 18 (1943)
15. 91 Cong. Rec. 18 (1945).
16. 89 Cong. Rec. 4889 (1943)
17 91 Cong. Rec. 6003 (1945)
18. 90 Cong. Rec. 4470 (1944), 92 Cong. Rec. 10536-37 (1946). In
both Congresses, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended the bill to
pass. 89 Cong. Rec. 9436 (1943) , 91 Cong. Rec. 9616 (1945).
19. H.R. 7, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). "An Act Making unlawful
the requirement for the payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in
primary or other election for national officers."
20. 93 Cong. Rec. 40 (1947).
21. Id. at 9718. In this Congress as in preceding Congresses since 1941,
other anti-poll tax bills, similar to or identical with H.R. 7, were introduced
by members of Congress other than Marcantomo, Pepper, or Geyer.
22. 93 Cong. Rec. 9718 (1947)
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bills was accompanied by counter-proposals and other measures
related to the poll tax requirement. Resolutions for amendments
to abolish tax and property qualifications were introduced in sever-
al Congresses .2 The resolution introduced by Senator O'Mahoney,
Democrat, of Wyoming, is typical. It was as follows.
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by
reason of failure to pay any tax or on account of any property quali-
fication.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
with the appropriate legislation.2 4
Another proposal was to reduce the representation from the south-
ern states in proportion to the number of voters prevented from
voting on account of the poll tax requirement.2 This proposal
was based on section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Nothing,
however, came of it.
In addition to the proposals mentioned, the Soldier Vote Bill,
Public Law 712, passed September 16, 1942, contained a provision
suspending the poll tax requirement for members of the armed
forces during the war.2 7 When this act was amended in 1944,
the poll tax exemption clause was retained.28
THE STATES' POWER OVER QUALIFICATION OF VOTERS
During the years of Congressional preoccupation with the
anti-poll tax bills, the principal subject of dispute was the con-
stitutionality of the bills. Although opposition in Congress to
23. 88 Cong. Rec. 7748 (1942), 93 Cong. Rec. 348 (1947), N. Y. Times,
May 18, 1944, p. 6, col. 5, N. Y. Times, May 30, 1944, p. 12, col. 7
24. 88 Cong. Rec. 7748 (1942).
25. N. Y. Times, November 3, 1943, p. 1, col. 1.
26. U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 2 reads as follows:
"Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any wvay abridged, except for participation in rebellion
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens hventy-one years of age in such State."
27. The provision was as follows "Section 2. No person in military
service at time of war shall be required, as a condition of voting in any elec-
tion for President, Vice President, or for Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives, to pay a poll tax or other tax or make any other pay-
ment to any State or political subdivision thereof." 56 Stat. 753 (1942), as
amended, 58 Stat. 136 (1944), 50 U. S. C. § 302 (1946).
28. 50 U. S. C. § 302 (1946).
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abolishing the poll tax requirement was not entirely, if mainly,
motivated by undue concern about constitutional questions, the
question of constitutionality does remain a major and legitimate
objection to the proposed anti-poll tax legislation.
The question of the constitutionality of the national anti-poll
tax bills arises largely because the states possess such broad powers
over voting qualifications in national elections. The poll tax re-
quirement for voting, it is argued or assumed, falls within the
scope of these powers, the national government may not encroach
upon them by undertaking the action contemplated by the anti-
poll tax bills.
It is generally recognized that the states do enjoy rather ex-
tensive authority over voting qualifications in national elections.
In the past this authority has been exercised subject to few limi-
tations..2 9 The Fifteenth 30 and Nineteenth Amendments, 1 pro-
hibiting qualifications of race and sex, respectively, have been the
principal limitations.
The major sources of state authority over voting qualifications
in the Constitution are the two provisions defining the electors of
Representatives and Senators section 2 of article I and the Seven-
teenth Amendment. Section 2 of article I is as follows
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and
the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. 2
The qualifications clause of the Seventeenth Amendment is the
same with respect to elections of Senators. 81 By these provisions
the qualifications which the states prescribe for electors of the
most numerous branch of the state legislatures are accepted as
those of electors of Representatives and Senators. This means
that, in effect, the states are determining the qualifications that
will apply in elections for Representatives and Senators.
29. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 218 (1875).
30. U. S. Const. Amend. XV, which reads in part "The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."
31. U. S. Const. Amend. XIX, which reads in part "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex."
32. U. S. Const. Art. I, § 2.
33. U. S. Const. Amend. XVII, which reads in part. "The Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected
by the people thereof, for six years, and each Senator shall have one vote.
The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of
the most numerious branch of the State legislature."
[Vol. 33.217
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In exact terms of constitutional law, however, the states do
not prescribe the qualifications of the electors of Representatives
and Senators. This principle was dearly delineated in Ex parte
Yarbrough:
The states, in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the most
numerous branch of their own state legislatures, do not do this with
reference to the election for members of Congress. Nor can they
prescribe the qualifications for voters for those eo vo;nine. They
define who are to vote for the popular branch of their own legis-
lature, and the Constitution of the United States says that the
same persons shall vote for members of Congress m that state. It
adopts the qualifications thus furnished as the qualifications of its
own electors for members of Congress. . .34
Despite this principle, the practical operation of the Constitution
in leaving to the states the determination of qualifications that are
adopted by the Constitution as those of electors of Representa-
tives and Senators is generally conceded as justifying the state-
ment that the states have broad authority over voting qualifications
in national elections.
The framers of the Constitution intended to leave to the states
authority over qualifications by section 2 of article I. As Hamil-
ton pointed out in the Federalist, this constitutional provision
conformed to the "standard," meaning voting qualifications, estab-
lished or to be established by the states. 5 Consequently, it left
to the states the power to establish the qualifications that were to
be adopted by the Constitution as national qualifications. This
solution of the qualifications problem was the most acceptable of
alternatives proposed at the Constitutional Convention. "
Decisions of the Supreme Court 7 and standard legal refer-
ences 8 admit the great powers of the states over voting qualifi-
cations granted by section 2 of article I and the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. This is true even though the Supreme Court has recently
34. 110 U. S. 651, 663 (1884).
35. The Federalist, No. 52 (Hamilton).
36. It was found unsatisfactory to reduce all the qualifications in elec-
tions for Representatives to one uniform standard, thereby creating a distinct
national electorate. It was also found unsatisfactory to give Congress power
to establish and regulate voting qualifications. See 5 Elliott, Debates on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 385-88 (1866).
37 E.g., Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (U.S. 1874), United States
v. Reese, 92 U. S. 218 (1875) ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542(1875) ; Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1904) ; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302
U. S. 277 (1937) ; United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941).
38. E.g., 2 Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 1360(8th ed. 1927); McCrary, Treatise on the American Law of Elections 43-45
(2d ed. 1880), 1 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 405 (3d ed. 1858), 2 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the
United States 626-33 (2d ed. 1929).
19491
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reemphasized the principle that the right to vote for Representa-
tives (and Senators) is a right stemming from section 2 of article
I (and the Seventeenth Amendment) of the Constitution, one
that is guaranteed and protected by that instrument."' For it is
the right of qualified voters to cast their ballots for Representa-
tives and Senators that is a national right protected by the Con-
stitution.40 As Willoughby, relying upon Ex parte Yarbrough to
some extent, says
A distinction is to be made between the right to vote for a
Representative to Congress and the conditions upon which that
right is granted the right to vote is conditioned upon and
determined by state law But the right itself, as thus determined,
is a federal right. That is to say, the right springs from the pro-
vision of the federal Constitution that Representatives shall be
elected by those who have the right in each State to vote for the
members of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.
The Constitution thus gives the right but accepts, as its own, the
qualifications which the States severally see fit to establish with
reference to the election of the most numerous branch of their
several state legislatures. 41 (Italics supplied.)
In other words, the Constitution confers and protects the right
to vote for members of Congress only upon those qualified by the
states to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the
state legislatures.
Two provisions of the Constitution other than section 2 of
article I and the Seventeenth Amendment indirectly leave to the
states powers over voting qualifications. The first is section 1 of
article II which grants to the states the right to choose the man-
ner of appointing Presidential electors. If elections are designated
as the manner of appointing electors, the states have authority to
determine what shall be the qualifications of voters in these elec-
tions.42 The second provision is the second section of the Four-
teenth Amendment. "This section of the amendment clearly recog-
nizes the right of a state to adopt suffrage qualifications which
39. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), basing the decision
in part upon Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884) Other cases em-
phasizing this principle include United States v. Moseley, 238 U. S. 383
(1915), and Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 62 (1900)
40. See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 307, 310, 314 (1941)
For example at 307 the court says, "The questions for decision are whether
the right of qualified voters to vote in the Louisiana primary and to have
their ballots counted is a right secured by the Constitution (Italics sup-
plied.) Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 62, 64 (1900)
41. Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States 540-41
(1910). See Wiley v. Sinkler, supra at 64.
42. McCrary, op. cit. supra note 38, at 43.
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exclude certain of its adult male citizens from voting."' 3 By this
section the state is penalized for denying the right to vote to male
citizens of twenty-one years of age for reasons other than partici-
pation in rebellion or other crime, but the right to deny the suf-
frage, meaning ordinarily the right to establish qualifications re-
stricting the right to vote, is legally sanctioned.
The poll tax requirement, it is argued by those opposed to
the anti-poll tax bills, clearly falls within the scope of the state
powers to determine voting qualifications in national elections. The
states have prescribed the poll tax requirement as a qualification
for voting in their state constitutions.4 4 It is required of voters
in elections for members of the most numerous branch of the
state legislatures. It becomes automatically a qualification for voting
in elections for Representatives and Senators by virtue of section
2 of article I and the Seventeenth Amendment. The national gov-
ernment is, constitutionally, compelled to accept the poll tax re-
quirement as one of the qualifications for voting in elections for
Representatives and Senators. It must, not only because if it did
not, it would clearly be invading the province of state powers, but
also because if it did not, there would be two sets of qualifications,
one in elections for members of the larger branch of the state
legislatures and one in elections for Representatives and Senators.
The Constitution manifestly intended the qualifications in state
and national elections to be the same.
With respect to Presidential elections, the states have even
greater authority to prescribe the poll tax requirement. The na-
tional government has no alternative but to accept it in these elec-
tions as well as in Congressional elections.
If it is desirable to abolish the poll tax requirement for voting
in national elections, the proper way to do it is by constitutional
amendment. This was the course found necessary in the past when
the national government wanted to abolish qualifications of race
and sex adopted by the states. It is just as necessary today.
THE POLL TAX REQgUxIEmNT AS A VOTING QUALIFICATION
To sustain the constitutionality of the anti-poll tax bills in the
face of the broad powers of the states over voting qualifications in
national elections, the usual approach of defenders of the bills is to
43. Mathews, The American Constitutional System 363 (2d ed. 1940).
44. In almost all the constitutions of the Poll tax states, the poll tax
requirement is found mn the section on qualifications. See New York Con-
stitutional Convention Comnussion,. Constitutions of the States and the
United States (1938), 59 (Texas) , 373 (South Carolina) . 885 (Mississippi)
1580 (Virginia) ; 101 (Arkansas).
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argue that the poll tax requirement is not a qualification for voting
within the meaning of the Constitution. This argument was the
basis of the most important anti-poll tax bills, S. 1280, H.R. 7, and
H.R. 29
This approach implies a recognition of the powers of the states
over voting qualifications, and is an attempt to evade their jurisdic-
tion. It assumes, however, that the state powers are not so absolute
that the national government cannot question a requirement pre-
scribed as a qualification by the states. The powers of the states
are not so absolute, it is assumed, that the national government
must accept whatever requirements the states see fit to impose upon
voters in national elections.
This assumption is permissible because the powers of the states
over voting qualifications are not absolute, but are limited by
other parts of the Constitution. These limitations are not confined
to the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court
in Breedlove v. Suttles indicated this by referring to limitations
placed upon the states by the two suffrage amendments and "other
provisions of the Constitution."'4 And the Court in United States
v. Classic mentioned specifically section 4 of article I and the
necessary and proper clause as providing limitations on state power
to regulate the right to vote.4" Also, in Minor v. Happersett Chief
Justice Waite intimated that Congressional action might interfere
with qualifications prescribed by the states.47
Standard legal references also admit restrictions other than the
suffrage amendments upon the power of the states over voting
qualifications in national elections. 48 Two such restrictions are the
45. 302 U. S. 277, 283 (1937)
46. 313 U. S. 299, 315 (1941). The Court said. " while in a loose
sense, the right to vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken
of as a right derived from the states, see Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162,
170, United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 217-18, McPherson v. Blacker,
146 U. S. 1, 38-39; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U. S. 277, 283, this statement is
true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution to
legislate on the subject as provided by Sec. 2 of Art. 1, to the extent that
Congress has not restricted state action by the exercise of its powers to
regulate elections under 4 and its more general power under Article 1. 8.
clause 18 of the Constitution to 'make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.'"
47 21 Wall. 162, 171 (U.S. 1875). As cited by Kallenbach, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 725, the Court said. "It is not necessary to inquire whether this
power of supervision [over Congressional elections] thus given to Congress
is sufficient to authorize any interference with the State laws prescribing the
qualifications of voters, for no such interference has ever been attempted.
The power of the State in this particular is certainly supreme until Congress
acts." (Italics supplied.)
48. See I Willoughby, op. cit. siuprc, note 41, at 539; Rottschaefer,
American Constitutional Law 753 (1939).
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equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment'
and the republican form of government clause of article IV '0
In an effort to show that the poll tax requirement is not a
qualification for voting, supporters of the anti-poll tax bills, re-
ferring to dictionaries-1 and court dedsions, 2 define qualification
as an endowment or acquirement relating to the fitness or capacity
of the person for a particular pursuit or profession. Applying this
definition to voting qualifications, it is argued that a voting qualifica-
tion must bear a reasonable relation to capacity to participate in
public affairs. It must be a test of such capacity or fitness. The
standard voting qualifications in the states today, like age, citizen-
ship, and residence, are tests of capacity to participate in public
affairs. Age tests a certain maturity of judgment, citizenship, a
certain interest in and stake in the community; and residence, a
knowledge of local affairs and a stake in the community.
Conversely, the poll tax requirement is not a test of fitness or
capacity to participate in public affairs, and, therefore, it is not a
qualification for voting. It "neither adds to nor detracts from the
ability of a voter to cast an intelligent vote in any election."' 3 It is
a "perfectly arbitrary and meaningless pretended qualification"
identical in principle with the requirement that only persons with
red hair or one hundred years of age may vote.5'
The fact that some voters are exempted from paying the poll
tax before voting is suggestive of the failure of the poll tax re-
quirement as a test of political capacity. For these voters are
exempted from the poll tax for reasons other -than capacity to
participate in public affairs. For example, persons over forty-five
49. U. S. Const Amend. XIV, § 1. It reads in part: "No State shall
deny to. any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
50. U. S. Const: Art. IV, § 4. It reads in part: "The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Umon a Republican Form of Government."
51. Webster defines a qualification as "any natural endowment or ac-
quirement which fits a person for a place, office, or employment."
52. (a) The Supreme Court in Cumnungs v. Missours, 4 Wall. 277, 319
(U.S. 1867) said that "qualifications relate to the fitness or capacity of the
party for a particular pursuit or profession." See Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S.
-630-(1914). -
(b) In Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O'Connell, 298 Ky. 44, 181
S. W. 2d 691 (1944), the Kentucky Court of Appeals said that "we are
inclined to the belief that qualifications as used in section 2 of article I of the
.federal Constitution means natural endowments or requirements which fit
.a peson for a place, office, or employment, or as an elector."
53. (a) 78 Cong. Rec. 8141 (1942).
(b) "The most shiftless' of meed may- pay the tax because he found a five
dollar bill on the street. The worthiest citizen may prefer to feed his
"amil... . " Nationa_ Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax, H.R. 7, the Anti-
Poll Tax Bill is Constitutional 1.
54. Sen. Rep. No. 625, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
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years of age in Alabama, over fifty in Tennessee, and over sixty
in Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas are exempted from the
poll tax. 5 Others are exempted on account ot military service or
physical disability "I If the poll tax requirement were a proper test
of political capacity, it would seem that all voters ought to be
subject to it.
It is argued that the poll tax requirement is not a proper test
of political capacity because some southerners are incapable of
paying the tax. Incomes in many southern states are low, and many
sharecroppers and tenant farmers receive no money income at all.
their income is advanced in food or supplies. 51 When there are
several in the family of voting age or when the poll tax is cumula-
tive, the obstacles to voting become insurmountable. Yet, these
people who cannot afford to pay the poll tax do not lack political
capacity, it is argued. They are found capable of sharing the obli-
gations and burdens of citizenship, such as military service, are
they not also capable of participating in the electoral function?
Not altogether consistent with the preceding argument is the
contention that the poll tax requirement bears little relationship
to wealth, if that is a proper test of political capacity today Unlike
earlier tax-paying and property qualifications which were intended
to be indices of wealth and a stake in the community, the poll tax
requirement is assessed on almost everyone in the electorate, but
only those who pay it are permitted to vote.5s A distinction is
made, in other words, between those who are assessed for the poll
tax and those who have paid it. Merely paying the tax is no assur-
ance of wealth or of political consciousness. Also, if it is desirable
that a person be a taxpayer in order to vote, there is little reason
to single out payers of the poll tax. Every economically inde-
pendent person pays at least a "hidden" tax today 59
Furthermore, historical evidence shows that the poll tax re-
quirement was not imposed to provide a test of fitness to participate
in public affairs, but to prevent arbitrarily large groups, Negroes
and poor whites, from voting.60 During the period of constitutional
55. Library of Congress, op. cit. supra note 2.
56. Ibid.
57 86 Cong. Rec. A2414 (1940) , Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Elections of the Committee on House Administration on H.R. 29, H.R. 7,
H.R. 66, H.R. 225, H.R. 230, H.R. 668, H.R. 1435, and H.R. 4040, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 126 (1947).
58. Kallenbach, op. cit. slipra note 2, at 728.
59. Ibid.
60. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary
on S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 253-54 (1942) , Porter, A History of
the Suffrage in the United States, c. 8, Sait, American Parties and Elections
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revision in the South from 1889 to 1908, the poll tax requirement
was adopted as one legal device to maintain white supremacy in
the South."' Also; there is evidence that the requirement was in-
troduced to disfranchise the poor whites as well as the Negro.62
It is significant that the period of constitutional revision coincided
generally with the Populist movement. Fear of the poor white
farmers who were politically active in the movement may have
been a reason for the poll tax requirement and other measures
designed to take advantage of economic shortcomings. It is true,
for example, that the white counties in which the Populist party
had been the strongest in Alabama and other states protested most
vigorously the imposition of the poll tax requirement." Showing
clearly that the poll tax requirement was not imposed to test
political capacity is the fact that some states relaxed or abandoned
measures of enforcing payment of the poll tax because too many
people paid the tax and could vote.6 4 Also, the requirement that
the poll tax be paid considerably in advance of the election dis-
closes the intention of making it inconvenient to pay the poll tax ;6
this inconvenience prevents people from voting.
The argument that the poll tax requirement is not a qualifica-
tion for voting is challenged by those opposed to the anti-poll tax
legislation. They attack, first of all, the definition of qualification
produced by supporters of the anti-poll tax bills. The dictionary
definition does not, it is asserted, denote a test of fitness. It refers
only to "what qualities are included or possessed without any
implications of particularly appropriate qualities or particular fit-
46-57 (rev. ed. 1939), McCullock, Suffrage and Its Problems 77-108 (1929),
Jones, Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901 and Poll Taxes, 4 Alabama
Lawyer, 3-22 (1943); Lewinson, Race, Class and Party 79-97 (1932), 86
Cong. Rec. A4124, A6875 (1940), 84 Cong. Rec. A4124 (1939).
61. The President of the Alabama constitutional convention pointed out
that the poll tax was one device adopted to maintain white supremacy in
every one of the southern states in which conventions had been called to dis-
franchise the Negro. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 253-54 (1942), citing Journal of Alabama
Constitutional Convention of 1901, 13.
62. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on
S. 1280. 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 315 (1942), Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Elections of the Committee on House Administration on H.R.
29, H.R. 7, H.E. 66, H.R. 225. H.R. 230. H.R. 668, H.R. 1435, and H.R. 4040.
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947), 97 Cong. Rec. A4124 (1939), 86 Cong.
Rec. A4124, A6875 (1940).
63. Lewinson, op. cit. supra note 60, c. 4, 5.
64. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on
S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 254-55 (1942).
65. In Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas, the voter must pay the poll tax
by February 1 of each year; and in Arkansas, by October 1. In Virginia, it
must be.paid six months before elections; in Tennessee. sixty days, and in
South Carolina thirty days. Library of Congress, op. cit. su pra note 2.
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ness."6 It is argued, also, that a voting qualification does not
necessarily mean a test of capacity Rather,,voting qualifications
have been and are whatever rules and regulations or conditions
defining who may vote that the people of the states have seen fit
to impose in their state constitutions.0 7 Even if the state constitu-
tions should require the possession of green eyes or red hair as
qualifications for voting, such requirements would be valid quali-
fications. 68 Sex and race requirements were not tests of capacity,
yet these were considered voting qualifications and were abolished
only by constitutional amendment. 9 The only test of a qualifica-
tion in national elections is whether or not it is identical with that
of electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature, as
Davie suggested in the Constitutional Convention."0
It is also argued that even if the definition of voting qualifica-
tion as a test of capacity be accepted, the poll tax requirement
meets that definition. The poll tax requirement is a proper test of
political capacity because it tests the citizen's interest in and con-
cern for the well-being of the community It tests the citizen's
concern for public education for which the poll tax is levied. 71 It
also tests his interest in protecting his ballot, as indicated by the
federal court in Pirtle v. Brown.7" It keeps out those unworthy
voters who have no interest in public affairs, those who are too
inert to pay the very small fee required.
7 3
It is argued, furthermore, that the poll tax requirement in
particular and the tax-paying qualifications in general have been
accepted as valid qualifications in American experience, and, today,
are accepted as such by the courts and other legal authorities.
The poll tax requirement was a qualification for voting in
New Hampshire when the Constitution was adopted.7 4 General
tax paying qualifications existed in other states. 5 The framers of
the Constitution undoubtedly knew about these requirements, yet,
66. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on
S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 407 (1942)
67 Id. at 98, 373.
68. 88 Cong. Rec. 8093 (1942).
69. Id. at 9011.
70. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on
S. 1280, pt. 1, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 372 (1942), citing 4 Elliott, op. cit. supra
note 36, at 58.
71. Looney, Constitutionality of Anti-Poll Tax Measures, 7 Tex. Bar J.
91 (1944) , Hearings before the Committee on Rules and Administration, on
H.R. 29, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1948)
72. 118 F 2d 218. 221 (C.C.A. 6th 1941)
73. Looney, op. cit. supra note 71.
74. McCulloch, op. cit. supra note 60.
75. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on
S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1942)
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nothing was said in the Constitutional Convention to indicate their
rejection of such requirements as qualifications within the power
of the states to prescribe. 6
Numerous state court decisions have sustained the poll tax
requirement as a qualification for voting." Furthermore, and of
particular significance, two federal court decisions have also up-
held the constitutionality of the poll tax requirement. Breedlove v.
Suttles78 and Pirtle v. Brown.0
The foregoing arguments supporting the position that the poll
tax requirement is a voting qualification within the powers of the
states to prescribe are formidable. They succeed in exposing weak-
nesses in the case presented by defenders of the anti-poll tax bills,
but they do not succeed in destroying that case.
The definition of qualification relied upon by those opposing
the anti-poll tax bills is incomplete because it ignores the indis-
pensable element of fitness or capacity incorporated m the usual
dictionary definition of qualification. Also, it is not true that voting
qualifications are whatever rules and regulations the states see fit
to impose upon voters. As already indicated, the states do not have
absolute powers over voting qualifications, but are limited by
constitutional provisions other than those associated immediately
with qualifications. If the regulations imposed by the states violate
other provisions of the Constitution, it would appear evident that
those regulations could be suppressed by Congress as not consti-
tuting proper qualifications for voting. Furthermore, it is not true
that the framers of the Constitution ignored tests of fitness m their
deliberations upon voting qualifications. Numerous statements of
the members of the Convention controvert that view. For example,
Colonel Mason displayed concern about fitness or capacity for
voting when he declared that "attachment to, and permanent com-
mon interest with, the society," were* proper standards in estab-
lishing qualifications.80 And Ellsworth presumed a test of fitness
when he argued for tax-paying qualifications on the basis that
those "who bear a full share of the public burdens . . [ought to
be] allowed a voice ... [in their imposition]."81 Finally, it is not
true that qualifications in the past, such as sex and race, were
wholly unreasonable as tests of fitness. There might be some justi-
76. Ibid.
77. Id. at 369, citing Note, 130 A. L. R. 572.
78. 302 U. S. 277 (1937).
79. 118 F. 2d 218 (C.C.A. 6th 1941).
80. 5 Elliott, op. cit. supra note 36, at 387.
-81. Id. at 386.
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fication for qualifications of race and sex earlier in American his-
tory when neither women nor Negroes were as a rule politically
conscious or independent agents.
82
The view that the poll tax requirement is a test of fitness to
vote is also not successful. The arguments presented to show that
it is not such a test survive despite the barrage of criticism against
them. For example, it can hardly be maintained that the poll tax
requirement was imposed to test community consciousness or in-
terest in public education in the face of evidence that enforcement
measures were abandoned because the poll tax was generally paid.
That the federal courts and other courts have sustained the
poll tax requirement is also not conclusive. The courts did not
examine the contention that the requirement was not a qualification
for voting nor did they consider Congressional findings to that
effect.
Finally, the existence of the poll tax requirement at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution does not materially weaken
the case for anti-poll tax legislation. The conditions surrounding
the suffrage at the time of the Constitutional convention and later
in American history bear upon the reasonableness of the poll tax
requirement as a test of fitness. Whatever justification there might
have been for the poll tax requirement earlier in American history
does not necessarily extend to the present day This is especially
true with respect to the poll tax requirement because, although
originally imposed to liberalize suffrage requirements, it later be-
came a restrictive suffrage measure. During the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries the poll tax requirement was de-
signed to extend the suffrage. s 3 It was easier to meet than general
tax-paying or property qualifications. It represented a transition
to a rationale which placed greater emphasis upon the qualities
of the voter himself rather than property or taxes. In the late nine-
teenth century, as already indicated, the poll tax requirement served
a directly contrary purpose, that of restricting the suffrage. It
represented an arbitrary test of a citizen's stake in the community,
and its purpose was to disfranchise large numbers of people. It
was unhistorical in not recognizing the qualities of the voter him-
self as adequate tests of capacity in an age which did recognize them.
82. According to Porter, the Fifteenth Amendment was in sonic respects
an artificial attempt to remove a qualification that was still justified. Op cit.
sitpra note 60, at 150, 191.
83. Porter, op. cit. supra note 60, c. 2, Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Judiciary on S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1942)
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TRE "TRUE" NATURE OF THE POLL TAX REQUIREMENT
After disposing of the argument that the poll tax requirement
is a qualification for voting, supporters of the proposed anti-
poll tax legislation seek to determine the true nature of the re-
quirement in order to discover positive bases in the Constitution
that will permit Congress to abolish the requirement. Two of their
arguments concerning this problem particularly merit examina-
tion because they are incorporated m the recent anti-poll tax bills.
These are that the poll tax requirement is an interference with the
manner of holding elections and that it is a tax on a national
function. If the poll tax requirement is an interference with the
manner of holding elections, Congress has authority to abolish it
on the basis of section 4 of article I, the "times, places, and man-
ner" clause.84 If it is a tax on a national function, Congress has
authority to abolish it on the basis of a long line of court decisions
beginning with McCudloch v. Marylands5 which involve the neces-
sary and proper clause"8 and the supreme law of the land clause."-
Poll Tax as an Interference with Manner of Holding Elections
To uphold the contention that the poll tax requirement is an
interference with the manner of holding elections, three lines of
attack are launched. The first of these is that the poll tax require-
ment is essentially a regulation of voting. It is a regulation because
it is not a qualification for voting. It is imposed upon qualified
voters-that is, voters who meet all the voting qualifications but
the poll tax requirement which is not a qualification-as a condi-
tion precedent to their voting.88 In Breedlove v. Sullies, the Su-
preme Court, without taking cognizance of the qualification argu-
ment; treated the poll tax requirement as a regulation-a tax-
84. U. S. Const- Art. I, § 4. It reads in part as follows: "The Times.
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof, but the Con-
gress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of Chusing Senators."
85. 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819).
86. U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, clause 18. It reads: "To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the fore-
going Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
87 U. S. Const. Art. VI, which reads in part: "This Constitution. and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding'
88. Boudin, State Poll Taxes and the Federal Constitution, 28 Va. L.
Rev. 17 (1941).
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enforcing regulation.89 And there is some judicial precedent that a
"qualification" for voting may actually be concerned with the man-
ner or methods of voting. In Dumnit v. O'Connell the Kentucky
Court of Appeals decided that the requirement of presence at the
polls which was prescribed in the Kentucky constitution as a
"qualification" for voting was actually a "method by which an
otherwise qualified elector may cast his ballot in Congressional
elections," and could be abrogated by Congressional authority de-
rived from section 4 of article 1.90
Congress, it is argued, has abundant authority by section 4
of article I to abolish the poll tax requirement as a regulation of
elections. In the past extensive regulations have been made by
Congress in pursuance of authority granted by this section. For
example in United States v. Gradwell the Court said
Congress by them [the acts of Congress enacted under sec-
tion 4 of article I] committed to Federal officers a very full par-
ticipation in the process of the election of Congressmen, from the
registration of voters to the final certifying of the results and
control thus established over such elections was comprehensive and
complete.91
Far-reaching regulations are possible. In Smiley v. Hohn, Chief
Justice Hughes said
The subject matter is the "times, places, and manner of holding
elections for Senators and Representatives." It cannot be doubted
that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a
complete code for congressional elections. 92
The regulation contemplated by the poll tax legislation is
similar to that undertaken in the past, it is argued. In fact, it is
even argued, national statutes enacted under authority of section
4 and, also, the necessary and proper clause, of article I "have
undertaken to regulate and supervise elections far more minutely
than does H.R. 7 "' The Enforcement Act of 1870 and the
Soldier Vote Act of 1942 are cited as examples of this along with
other less pertinent acts. The Enforcement Act, among other
things, authorized national supervisors to challenge voters and to
check the registration of voters.9 4 This resulted in power to deter-
mine whether or not an intending voter had the requisite qualifica-
tions and involved the question of who may vote. The Soldier Vote
89. 302 U. S. 277,278 (1937).
90. 298 Ky. 44, 52-3, 181 S. W 2d 691, 696 (1944).
91. 243 U. S. 476, 483 (1916)
92. 285 U. S. 355, 366 (1932)
93. Crockett, Constitutionality of Federal Anti-Poll Tax Legslation, 2
Nat. Bar J. 49 (1944).
94. 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
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Act suspending the poll tax requirement for members of the armed
forces "at time of war" has already been mentioned. It is significant
that the act also removed the requirement of presence at the polls
for members of the armed forces "at time of war."
The most recent Senate report on the anti-poll tax bills, the
.report of the Committee on Administration and Rules, emphasizes
that the Soldier Vote Act provides the necessary precedent for
Congressional action upon the anti-poll tax bills.95 But the par-
ticular source of constitutional authority for this action is left in
doubt. And those opposed to the anti-poll tax bills seize upon the
question of the proper source of authority in the debates. The
general war powers of Congress are frequently cited by them as
the proper constitutional source of the Soldier Vote Act, rather
than the "times, places, and manner" clause.90
The second line of attack based on the "times, places, and
manner" clause made by defenders of the anti-poll tax bills is the
corrupt practices approach. It is argued that the poll tax require-
ment is an interference with the manner of holding elections be-
cause it leads to pernicious political activities which corrupt na-
tional elections. This argument was the basis of the Geyer bills.
There is abundant evidence that corrupt practices do result when
the poll tax requirement is imposed.97 Vote buying appears
prevalent in the poll tax states today. The political machine, indi-
vidual candidates, landlord, employer, or officers of certain or-
ganizations buy blocks of poll tax receipts, and issue them to voters
who are instructed to vote the "right" way.
Congress clearly has authority by section 4 of article I to act
against fraud and corruption, and has done so in the past.as Pro-
ponents of the anti-poll tax bills rely upon the broad statements in
Ex parte Yarbrough, Ex parte Siebold, and United States v.
Classic to demonstrate that these powers are broad enough to
embrace the abolition of the poll tax requirement. In the first case
mentioned, the Court stated that Congress can by statute protect
"the election itself from corruption and fraud."9 9 In the second
95. Sen. Rep. No. 1225, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1948).
96. Id. at 10; 89 Cong. Rec. 9782 (1943).
97. See 86 Cong. Rec. 9364, A2091, A5403 (1940), 87 Cong. Rec.
A3692 (1941), American Council on Public Affairs and Southern Confer-
ence for Human Welfare, op. cit. supra note 4, at 40; Strong, The Poll Tax"
The Case of Texas, 38 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 693-709 (1944) ; National Com-
mittee to Abolish the Poll Tax, op. cit. supra note 53, at 11-12; Le%\inson,
op. cit. stpra note 60, at 178; N. Y. Times, April 14, 1940, p. 2. col. 4.
98. Rottschaefer, op. cit. supra note 48, at 153-54, citing Ex part.
Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880) and Ex partc Coy, 127 U. S. 731 (1888).
99. 110 U. S. 651, 661 (1884).
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case, the Court argued that the "due and fair election" of Repre-
sentatives was of "vital importance" to the United States, and
could be enforced by section 4 of article I.100 And in the last case,
Justice Douglas in his dissent wrote that the "Constitution should
be read to give Congress an expansive, implied power to put beyond
the pale, acts which in their direct or indirect effect impair the.
integrity of Congressional elections." 101 The poll tax requirement,
it is claimed, can be abolished to protect the election itself from
fraud, to insure the due and fair election of Representatives and
Senators, and to eliminate the source of corruption impairing the
integrity of Congressional elections.
The third line of attack upon the poll tax requirement as an
interference with the manner of holding elections is not so clearly
related to the "times, places, and manner" clause as the preceding
two. This attack is that Congress may abolish the poll tax require-
ment on the basis of section 4 of article I because the requirement
is a restriction or burden on the right to vote in national elections.
Qualified voters (those who have not paid their poll tax, but have
met legitimate qualifications for voting) are imposed upon because
they must pay the burdensome, prohibitory, or inconvenient tax
before they may vote.
It is asserted that Congress has power by section 4 of article I
to protect the right to vote and to legislate regarding it. James
Madison in the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788 viewed
section 4 as supplying protection of the right to vote. In speaking
of the section in general, he said "Should the people of any State,
by any means, be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was judged
proper that it be remedied by the General Government.' 12 Also, in
the recent United States v. Classic decision, the Court in refuting
the claim that the right to vote is derived exclusively from the
states, indicated that this right may be regulated by the powers
of Congress granted in the "times, places, and manner" clause
and the necessary and proper clause.'0 3 Since the poll tax require-
ment denies the vote to many and burdens and inconveniences it
for others, it follows that Congress may abolish it on authority of
section 4 of article I.
Those opposed to the anti-poll tax bills vigorously deny all the
100. 100 U. S. 371, 388 (1879)
101. 313 U. S. 299, 330 (1941)
102. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary
on S. 1280, 77th Cong.. 2d Sess. 529 (1942), citing 3 Elliott's Debate.
op. cit. supra note 36, at 367
103. 313 U. S. 299, 323 (1941)
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contentions advanced to prove that the poll tax requirement is an
interference with the manner of holding elections and within Con-
gressional powers derived from section 4 of article I. They argue
that the poll tax requirement is a qualification for voting and that
Congress has no authority whatsoever to prescribe or regulate
qualifications for voting by the "times, places, and manner"
clause.'0 It is self-evident, they declare, that the manner of hold-
ing elections refers only to the mechanics, the mode, and the how
of the election, and not to the question of who shall vote or what
qualifications voters shall possess.10 5 Furthermore, "there is not
a single decision of the United States courts that even intimates
that 'manner' of conducting an election includes the qualifications
of electors."'01 That the power to regulate elections does not ex-
tend to qualifications of voters was repeatedly emphasized in the
conventions ratifying the Constitution ;10o7 in the Federalist,os and
in court decisions. 09
With respect to the pernicious practices argument, the remedy
proposed-that is, removing the corruption by abolishing the poll
tax requirement-is generally attacked rather than contesting the
existence of foul play at the polls."' This assumes that the poll
tax requirement and the fraud or corruption it may produce are
two separate elements. The poll tax requirement is either a voting
qualification or tax within the power of the states to impose and
beyond the bounds of national power. The fraud or corruption
produced may be eliminated by Congressional action based on the
"times, places, and manner" clause. In other words, the proper
remedy for pernicious political activities is a Congressional statute
making unlawful the vote-buying and other fraudulent practices
resulting from the poll tax requirement. Or Congress could simply
provide for the effective enforcement by national means of the
existing state statutes which declare such activities unlawful."'
This species of action rather than abolishing a voting qualification
104. Looney, op. cit. supra note 71, at 88-89; 91 Cong. Rec. 6083, 6090
(1945), 88 Cong. Rec. A3881 (1942), Hearings before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Judiciary on S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 412 (1942),
Hearings before the Committee on Rules and Administration on H.R. 29,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1948).
105. Looney, op. cit. supra note 71.
106. Hearings before the Committee on Rules and Administration on
H.R. 29, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1948).
107 2 Elliot, op. cit. supra note 36, 51, 4 Elliot 61, 71, 5 Elliot 386.
108. The Federalist, No. 60.
109. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 397 (1880).
110. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on
S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 379, 414 (1942) ; 88 Cong. Rec. 8148 (1942).
111. For these provisions see Library of Congress, op. cit. supra note 2.
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is the proper course to follow and describes the course Congress
has followed in the past.1 '
These objections to the argument that the poll tax requirement
is an interference with the manner of holding elections and within
Congressional powers derived from section 4 of article I are not
conclusive. Generally speaking, they may be disputed because they
hinge upon the assertion that the poll tax requirement is a quali-
fication for voting. If the poll tax requirement is not a qualifica-
tion for voting, the objection that the "times, places, and manner"
clause does not embrace the power to regulate qualifications is
beside the point. A qualification is not being disturbed. A reason-
ably effective case has already been described to show that the poll
tax requirement is not a proper qualification for voting. Also, the
powers of Congress to regulate elections as interpreted by the
courts may very well prove broad enough to embrace the poll tax
requirement as a regulation of voting, as a source of corruption in
elections, or as an unjustified interference with the national right
to vote.
Poll Tax as a Tax upon a National Function
The second leading argument concerning the true nature of the
poll tax requirement is that the requirement is a tax upon a na-
tional function-the right of qualified voters to vote for United
States Representatives and Senators. To defend this position it is
alleged that the poll tax requirement is a tax measure rather than
a voting qualification."' Reference is made to both the federal poll
tax cases, Breedlove v. Suttles M4 and Pirtle v. Brown,1ii in which
the requirement was treated as a tax measure. For example, in the
Breedlove case, the Court, in stating that the poll tax requirement
did not discriminate on account of sex in violation of the Nine-
teenth Amendment, said that such a construction "would make the
amendment a limitation on the power to tax." 6
That the poll tax requirement is not a qualification for voting
has already been sufficiently examined. It is argued next that the
right to vote for Representatives and Senators is a function of
the national government which may not be taxed by the states by
employing a tax measure such as the poll tax requirement for
voting. In the words of the Senate judiciary Committee, the poll
112. United States v. Gale, 109 U. S. 565 (1883), Smiley v. Holn, 285
U. S. 355 (1932) , United States v Gradewell, 243 U. S. 476 (1916)
113. Boudin, op. cit. supra note 88, at 17-18.
114. 302 U. S. 277, 284 (1937)
115. 118 F 2d 218, 220 (C.C.A. 6th 1941).
116. 302 U. S. 277, 284 (1937)
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tax requirement is "in effect taxing a Federal function. The most
sacred and highest of all Federal functions is the right to vote. It is
not within the province of a State, or its legislature, to fix a fee
or tax which a voter must pay in order to vote."""- The right to
vote referred to in this quotation is the right of qualified voters to
vote for Representatives and Senators. That right is one protected
by and granted by the national Constitution, it is a national right.
It is also a national function. Voting is regarded as a function of
government by contemporary political scientists. 18
It is a familiar and well-established principle of constitutional
law that the states may not without the consent of Congress tax a
national function or the means by which the national government
performs its functions.119 In fact, the tax need but touch upon the
means by which the national government performs its functions
to be declared unconstitutional by the courts or to be abolished by
Congress. 120 This point is relevant to the poll tax question. The
poll tax does not tax voting directly. Not all voters have to pay
it; its payment as a prerequisite to voting is regarded as a means
of collecting the poll tax. But the poll tax requirement bears upon
the function of voting. It is a burden, impediment, or nuisance
required of the majority of voters, and it results in reducing the
size of the electorate. It is also argued that "there is a certain field
in which the constitutionality of a state tax touching a federal
function depends upon Congressional action."''"- In some instances
the states may tax indirectly a national function or franchise unless
Congress declares that such taxation would be detrimental to the
exercise of the function or franchise. Applying this principle to the
poll tax question, it may be argued that Congress has authority
117. Sen. Rep. No. 625, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945).
118. Shepard, Suffrage, 14 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 449 (1933). He says. "The
theory of the suffrage generally accepted by contemporary political scientists
is that voting is a function of government. The voter does not exercise a
natural right when he casts his ballot, but performs a public governmental
office. The electorate is not identical with the people, the sovereign authority
in the state and the ultimate source of law; it is an organ of government,
established, organized and determined by the law, which can moreover limit,
expand or totally abolish it. The problem of who shall vote becomes, under
tls theory, one of mere political expediency, similar to the problem of the
composition and organization of the legislature or the courts."
119. Field, A Selection of Cases and Authorities on Constitutional Law
77-96 (1930); Rottschaefer, op. cit. supra note 48, at 96-110; 2 Cooley,
op. cit. supra note 38, 981. Recent cases reveal a more liberal attitude of the
court toward intergovernmental taxation, but the stated principle remains.
120. Boudin, op, cit. supra note 88, at 20, relying upon Weston v.
Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (U.S. 1842) and Bank Tax cases, 2 Wall. 200 (U.S.
1864).
121. Id. at 21.
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to pass the poll tax legislation upon its decision that the poll tax
requirement undesirably taxes a national function.
This contention that the poll tax requirement is a tax upon a
national function is difficult to maintain, however, in the face of
federal court decisions on the matter. In the Pirtle case, the court
directly addressed itself to the inquiry whether "the state has levied
a poll tax upon the exercise of the elective franchise," and con-
cluded that it did not. 1'2 2 The court expressed itself as follows
[The Tennessee acts] do not levy or assess a poll tax on voters
as a class. Voters are nowhere referred to. It is of course true that
a large number of voters would be liable for the tax but it is just
as true that a large number, such as those over fifty years of ae,
would not. Upon the other hand a large class of inhabitants in-
eligible to vote at all, such as aliens, persons convicted of infamous
crimes, persons who have not lived in the state and county for the
requisite period of time, and all persons who do not choose to vote,
are still liable for the tax 123
In the Breedlove case the poll tax requirement was declared to be
an effective, reasonable, and traditional method of collecting the
poll tax, a necessary concomitant of the power to levy the tax.
Abolishing the tax would infringe upon the taxing powers of the
states. 12 4 The citation of Magnano Company v. Hamilton12 5 in the
Breedlove decision is indicative of the reasoning in the Breedlove
case. The implication is that the court will not inquire into the
motive for imposing the poll tax requirement, on its face the re-
quirement is a means adopted to the end of effectively enforcing
payment of the tax.
These federal court cases need not, however, be regarded as a
bar to all further litigation or discussion of the poll tax issue.
In both cases, the courts were treating the right to vote as a state
matter rather than as a national right.12 0 It is conceivable that
recognition of the fact that the poll tax requirement impinges upon
a national right to vote would alter future court action, especially
if Congress were to make a finding to that effect. Also, it may be
argued that it is not necessary to apply the test of class identity
to determine whether or not the right to vote is taxed even though
such a test may be applied to determine whether or not a voting
requirement is a voting qualification. The right to vote need not
be treated collectively to be a national function. The right of a
122. 118 F 2d 218, 220 (C.C.A. 6th 1941)
123. Ibid.
124. 302 U. S. 277, 278, 282-84 (1937).
125. 292 U. S. 40 (1934)
126. 302 U. S. 277 283 (1937) , 118 F 2d 218. 220 (C.C.A. 6th 1941)
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majority of voters is burdened by the collection of the poll tax.
Their exercise of a national function is taxed. Also, the effect of the
poll tax requirement m reducing the size of the electorate would
seem proof enough that the right to vote is affected by the poll
tax requirement.
In pursuit of the true nature of the poll tax requirement those
in favor of the anti-poll tax bills do not stop with the arguments
embraced m the bills themselves. Several other contentions are
advanced. Among these three are worthy of some attention. (1)
the poll tax requirement is an abridgment or denial of a privilege
or immunity of national citizenship; (2) the poll tax requirement
is a subversion of the republican form of government in the states,
and (3) the poll tax requirement is an abridgment or denial of the
right of the Negro to vote. Proof of any of these contentions would
furnish Congress with authority to abolish the poll tax require-
ment. If the first is sustained, Congress may act on the basis of the
Fourteenth Amendment ; -- if the second is sustained, Congress
may act on the basis of section 4 of article IV, if the third is sus-
tained, Congress may-act on the basis of the Fifteenth Amendment
or the equal protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Poll Tax as Abridgment of a Privilege of National Citicenship
The poll tax requirement is regarded as an abridgment or
denial of a privilege or immunity of national citizenship because it
abridges or denies the right to vote for United States Representa-
tives and Senators. The courts have recognized that the right to
vote for Representatives and Senators-that is, the right of voters
qualified by the states to vote for members of the most numerous
branch of the state legislatures-is among the privileges or im-
munities of national citizenship.1-s That this right of qualified
voters (those who have met legitimate qualifications but not the
poll ta:Z requirement) to vote is being denied or abridged has been
touched upon already. There is other pertinent evidence.
*With respect to this evidence suffice it to say that the poll tax
requirement is apparently succeeding in keeping people from vot-
ing as the framers of the southern constitutions intended that it
127 U. S. Const. Amend. XIV §0 1, 5. Section I of the Amendment
reads in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or inunities of citizens of the United States", and section 5
reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article."
128. Rottschaefer, op. cit. supra note 48, at 447, citing Ex parte Yar-
brough, Field, op. cit. supra note 119, at 652.
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should. Although, to be sure, it is difficult to ascertain the weight
to be assigned to every factor in non-voting in the southern poll
tax states, broad trends in voting statistics suggest that the poll
tax requirement is a large factor in non-voting. For example, in the
poll tax states fewer people vote than in the northern or other
southern states with the exception of one or two former poll tax
states. -12 9 Fewer people vote in the poll tax states than in nearby
southern states having similar social, political, and economic condi-
tions.1 30 Also, voting participation increased after the poll tax
requirement was removed in southern states.1 3 1 Furthermore, the
number of voters was significantly decreased after the poll tax
requirement was imposed.' 3'
In opposing this privilege and immunities argument, reliance
is again placed upon the decisions of the federal courts in the poll
tax cases. In Breelove v. Suttles the Supreme Court said specifical-
ly "To make payment of poll taxes a prerequisite of voting is not
to deny any privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."'13 The lower federal court in Pirtle v. Brown em-
phatically endorsed that statement." 4 These decisions were based in
large part upon the supposition that the right to vote is not one of
the privileges or immunities of national citizenship." 5 And other
evidence such as the intention of framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is cited by those opposed to the anti-poll tax bills to em-
phasize this point." 6
The assertion that the right to vote is not one of the privileges
or immunities of national citizenship is grounded on a misconcep-
129. For example, in the 1940 Congressional elections, the eight poll
tax states (including Georgia which had the requirement at this time) and
Louisiana occupied the lowest positions in the list of states arranged in
order of the number of people voting in comparison with the total population
of each state. At the top of the list was Indiana with 51.39 per cent of her
population voting. At the end of the list were Texas with 15.89 per cent:
Tennessee, 14.31 per cent; Louisiana, 13.56 per cent, Virginia, 11.82 per cent,
Arkansas, 10.72 per cent; Alabama, 9.52 per cent, Georgia, 8.69 per cent,
Mississippi. 6.7 per cent; and South Carolina, 5.25 per cent. 87 Cong. Rec.
Al119 (1941). See 88 Cong. Rec. 8771 (1942) , 86 Cong. Rec. A6962, Hear-
ings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on S. 1280, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 286-88 (1942) , Hearings before the Committee on Rules and
Administration on H.R. 29, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 329-31 (1948)
130. 88 Cong. Rec. A116 (1942)
131. 86 Cong. Rec. 9048 (1940), quoting from research of Eleanor
Bontecou, American Association of University Women.
132. Ibid.
133. 302 U. S. 277, 283 (1937).
134. 118 F 2d 218, 220 (C.C.A. 6th 1941).
135. Id. at 221, 302 U. S. 277, 283 (1937).
136. See Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. 170-71 (U.S. 1874) , Mc-
Crary, op. cit. supra note 39, at 3, Sen. Rep. No. 530, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
25-27 (1943), 90 Cong. Rec. 4180 ff. (1944)
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tion of the content and meaning of the national right to vote. It is
apparently assumed that the right to vote, defended as a privilege
of national citizenship, is a kind of natural right, a right conferred
upon all citizens of the United States, or a right that can be regu-
lated extensively by the national government. But it is the right
to vote for Representatives and Senators of those persons qualified
by the states to vote for the most numerous branch of the state
legislatures that is a privilege of national citizenship. And it is this
right, declare those in favor of anti-poll tax bills, that is abridged
or denied by the states. Voters are qualified to vote without meet-
ing the poll tax requirement. Their right to vote is impinged upon
by the poll tax requirement.
It is important to add that reliance upon the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for Congressional
authority to abolish the poll tax requirement is not necessary. Con-
gressional authority can be derived from the necessary and proper
clause, among other clauses, to protect the right to vote.5 7 In fact,
the necessary and proper clause provides a more complete au-
thority for Congressional action. While the Fourteenth Amend-
ment empowers Congress to prevent states from abridging or deny-
ing the right to vote, the necessary and proper clause empowers
Congress to prevent private individuals from abridging or denying
that right.13'
Poll Tax as Subversion of Republican Form of Govenment
A frequently encountered argument concerning the nature of
the poll tax requirement is the interesting one that the require-
ment subverts the republican form of government in the poll tax
states because it abridges or denies the right to vote to a large
segment of the voting population and results in reducing the size
of the electorates in the poll tax states.
The Senate Judiciary Committee declared that the right to
vote is an essential element of a republican form of government.
The most sacred right m our republican form of government
is the right to vote. It is fundamental that that right should not
'be denied unless there are valid constitutional reasons therefor. It
must be exercised freely by free men. If it is not, then we do not
have a republican form of government x,9
137. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 320 (1941). At 299 the
Court said that the right of the people to choose Representatives to Congress
was "secured against the action of individuals as well as the states. " The
decision repeatedly emphasized the necessary and proper clause as a source.
of Congressional authority to protect the right to vote.
138. Ibid.
139. Sen. Rep. No. 625, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1945).
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And referring to the poll tax states, the Committee continued
Can we have a republican form of government in any State
if, within that State, a large portion and perhaps a majority of the
citizens residing therein are denied the right to participate in
governmental affairs because they are poor? We submit that this
would be the result if under section 2, article I, of the Constitution,
the proposed law is held unconstitutional 140
Of especial significance in the dispute about the republican
form of government clause as it applies to the poll tax question is
the fact that Congress and the President rather than the courts
are the final determiners of the proper description or definition
of a republican form of government. Beginning with Luther v.
Borden,1 4 1 the courts have consistently held that questions arising
under the republican form of government clause, including the
question of what constitutes a republican form of government, are
"political" questions for the political departments of the govern-
ment, Congress and the President, to decide.14 The courts will
not review "political" questions. It follows that Congress may act
to guarantee the republican form of government in a state when
it decides that the state is no longer a republic according to what-
ever criteria Congress may employ If Congress determines that
the poll tax requirement results in a subversion of the republican
form of government in the poll tax states, it may abolish the re-
quirement. Its action will be upheld because the courts will not
review it.
In refutation of the republican form of government argument,
those opposed to the anti-poll tax bills claim that the poll tax
states do have republican forms of government. Some members of
the Senate Judiciary considered this self-evident,' 4 3 but arguments
other than appeal to self-evident truth have been broached.
It is said that the poll tax states are republics according to the
standard employed by the Supreme Court in Minor v. Happer-
sett.144 That standard was the similarity of a state government to
state governments at the time of adoption of the Constitution. This
standard is obviously met by the poll tax states today In terms
of voting qualifications, the states at the time of adoption of the
Constitution imposed general tax-paying qualifications and the
poll tax requirement. Many people were excluded from voting at
140. Ibid.
141. 7 How. 1 (U.S. 1849)
142. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 455 (1939), Rottschaefer.
op. czt. supra note 48 at 120; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in
the Federal Court, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485-513 (1924).
143. Sen. Rep. No. 625, 79th Cong.. 1st Sess. 14 (1945)
144. 21 Wall. 162, 175-76 (U.S. 1874)
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the polls. Therefore, the imposition of the poll tax requirement
and the exclusion of people from the polls in the poll tax states is
not subverting the republican forms of government in these states.
Defenders of the anti-poll tax legislation, it is declared, remain
unconvinced by their own arguments about the republican form
of government. Assuming that the poll tax requirement does deny
a republican form of government, the anti-poll tax bills will not
result in guaranteeing that form of government. The bills apply
only to national elections, not to state elections. The states will
still suffer from non-republican forms of government if the poll
tax requirement operates to disfranchise persons in state elec-
tions.'45 Furthermore, there is nothing specifically stated in the
anti-poll tax bills to indicate that Congress is assuming its obliga-
tion to act under section 4 of article IV
The contention that the poll tax requirement is a subversion of
the republican form of government in the poll tax states would not
be particularly impressive if it were not for the fact that courts have
regarded the republican form of government question to be a
"political" one. Although the courts have issued scattered remarks
about the elements of a republican form of government, such as
the one in Minor v. Happersett, they were not considering a Con-
gressional decision about the republican character of a state gov-
ernment; it is such a decision that has been declared to be a
"political" -question. And while the anti-poll tax bills do not refer
directly to the republican form of government, the Senate Judiciary
Committee does in its report. This is adequate evidence of the
intention of Congress to act by.authority of section 4 of article IV
Poll Tax as Denial of Right to Vote in Violation of
15th Ainendment
That the I oll tax requirement abridges or denies the right
to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude
is the third argument about the true nature of the poll tax require-
ment not found in the anti-poll tax bills. Although none of the
bills or majority reports of the Senate Judiciary Committee and
other committees having jurisdiction of the anti-poll tax bills con-
tain the argument, 4 6 it deserves consideration in view of its preva-
lence elsewhere.147
145. Sen. Rep. No. 625, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1945).
146. Id. at 3. Thi Committee points out that the poll tax requirement
was introduced to deprive the Negro of the right to vote, but adds that it vas
necessary to prohibit the white voter as well.
147. The argument is found in the following sources among others
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on S. 1280.
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Evidence that the poll tax requirement does discriminate against
the Negro is not lacking. The requirement was adopted in most of
the southern poll tax states as one legal means of disfranchising
the Negro. After the requirement was adopted, it is estimated that
the Negro vote dropped 80 per cent. 45 Today the participation of
the Negro in elections in the poll tax states is not impressve
*0
There is but little doubt that the poll tax requirement is partly
responsible for this. The poll tax requirement strikes at poverty
and carelessness, and there is the possibility of direct discrimina-
tion against the Negro in the administration of the poll tax laws.
The poll tax lists are kept by color in Alabama, Arkansas, and
Virginia. 150 When it is necessary to show a receipt in order to
vote, the Negro rather than the white is more likely to be asked to
do so.151
This argument concerning discrimination against the Negro is
not, however, pressed by the framers and supporters of the anti-
poll tax bills for a number of reasons. One of these is that, granting
the intention of disfranchising the Negro by the poll tax require-
ment, there was also the intention of disfranchising the "poor
whites." In any event, the result of the measure was to exclude
both Negroes and whites from the polls. Today more whites than
Negroes are barred from the polls or do not vote in the poll tax
states. 5 2 Also, the Negro vote did not show an increase or it
actually decreased after the poll tax requirement was abolished in
Louisiana, Florida, and North Carolina.'
5 3
Another reason for not emphasizing the denial of the Negro
vote in the poll tax dispute is that the constitutional provisions
and statutes providing for the poll tax requirement do not on their
face discriminate against the Negro. The groups which need not
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 186-87 (1942) , Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Elections of the Committee on House Administration on H.R. 29. 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 87-89 (1947) , Looney, op. cit. supra note 70, at 70, 89; Crockett,
op. cit. vtpra note 93, at 57-58.
148. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on
S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 312 (1942)
149. Id. at 313, Jackson, Race and Suffrage it the South Since 1Q10, 3
New South 3 (June-July, 1948)
150. Notes and Comments, 28 Corn. L. Q. 107 (1942)
151. Porter, op. cit. supra note 60, at 209; Lewinson, op. cit. supra note
60, at 144.
152. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary
on S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 312-13 (1942) It has been estimated that
4,700,000 whites were kept from voting in the 1940 elections in the poll tax
states in comparison with 2,400,000 Negroes.
153. 88 Cong. Rec. 9048 (1942), American Council on Public Affairs
and the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, op. cit. supra note 4, at 7,
N. Y. Times, May 30, 1943, § IV, p. 7, col. 6.
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pay the poll tax in order to vote are exempted on a reasonable
basis, as the Supreme Court in Breedlove v. Sultles decided. 1"'
This factor is important because the courts in the past have been
reluctant to declare unconstitutional those measures which did not
on their face discriminate against the Negro. For example, in
Williams v. Mississippi"5 the Supreme Court upheld a literacy
clause of the Mississippi Constitution even though abuse in the
administration of the clause was possible and more Negroes than
whites might be prevented from voting.
Minor Contentions
To complete the investigation of the "true" nature of the poll
tax requirement two minor arguments may be mentioned briefly
The first is that the poll tax requirement constitutes a threat to the
existence of the national government because it leads to corruption
in national elections and because it results in reducing the size
of the electorate. Preventing people from voting is a threat to the
representative and elective institutions of the national government,
Congress and the President. These institutions fail to represent
the great body of people of the United States. Also these institu-
tions represent the poll tax states out of proportion to the number
of voters in these states to the disadvantage of the non-poll tax
states.
5 6
The national government has inherent powers as a sovereign
government to meet threats to its existence.1 7 Hamilton in the
Federalist referred to a self-preservation power of the national
government, 58 and the Supreme Court in Burroughs v. Untled
States emphasized the "self-protection" power of the national gov-
ernment to prevent impairment or destruction of the departments
or institutions of the national government from fraud or corrup-
tion.15 9
The second minor argument occasionally employed to defend
the anti-poll tax bills is that the poll tax requirement discriminates
against the poor, and is, therefore, a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This discrimination
against those of small economic means violates the equal protection
154. 302 U. S. 277, 281-82 (1937).
155. 170 U. S. 213 (1898).
156. Poll tax Representatives, Senators and Presidential electors are
elected by fewer people than in other states. National Committee to Abolish
the Poll Tax, What the Poll Tax Means.
157 Crockett, op. cit. supra note 93, at 63.
158. The Federalist, No. 49 (Hamilton).
159. 290 U. S. 534, 544 (1934).
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clause because the discrimination is not reasonably adapted to the
purpose of the statute imposing the poll tax.6 0 It is a principle
of constitutional law developed from the equal protection of the
laws clause that the distinctions or the discriminations drawn by
the statute must be reasonably adapted to the purpose of the
statute.' The ostensible purpose of the statutes providing for the
poll tax requirement for voting is to collect revenue. The poll tax
laws have been sustained on such a basis. But the disfranchisement
of the poor as a result of discrimination is not reasonably adapted
to the purpose of the statutes. The effect of the disfranchisement
is to reduce the revenue from the poll taxes.
THE PROBLEM OF ABOLISHING THE POLL TAX REQUIREMENT
IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
All the preceding arguments about the "true" nature of the
poll tax requirement leave untouched an important and special
problem in the anti-poll tax dispute-the problem of abolishing
the poll tax requirement in "elections for President, Vice Presi-
dent, electors for President or Vice President." The constitutional
powers of Congress in Presidential elections are more limited
than those in Congressional and Senatorial elections. The argu-
ments concerning the nature of the poll tax requirement and the
related bases for Congressional action do not necessarily apply to
elections for Presidential electors. Separate examination of the
question whether or not Congress has power to abolish the poll
tax requirement in Presidential elections is, therefore, in order.
Those who maintain that Congress cannot abolish the poll tax
requirement in these elections emphasize that by section 1 of article
II the state legislatures have complete or exclusive powers over the
manner or mode of appointing Presidential electors.1 02 Congress
has only one power expressly given with respect to the appointment
of electors, that of determining the time of choosing electors.' 0'
Constitutional authorities 1 ' and Supreme Court decisions like
160. Notes and Comments, 28 Corn. L. Q. 108 (1942).
161. Id. at 108-109, citing Dowling, Cases on Constitutional Law 1084
(1941)
162. 88 Cong. Rec. 8146-49 (1942), 90 Cong. Rec. 4428-29 (1944).
U. S. Const. Art. II, § 1, which reads in part "Each State shall appoint.
in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors.
equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress."
163. U. S. Const. Art. II, § 1, clause 2. "The Congress may determine
the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day oti which they shall give their
votes which Day shall be the same throughout the United States."
164. Rottschaefer, op. cit. supra note 48, at 401, 2 Willoughby, op cit.
supra note 41, at 1126-27
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McPherson v. Blacker"5 and In re Green*6 uphold this extreme
view. For example, in McPherson v. Blacker, the Supreme Court
said.
In short, the appointment and mode of appointment of electors
belong exclusively to the States under the Constitution of the
United States. They are, as remarked by Mr. Justice Gray in Re
Green (134 U.S. 377 . ), "no more officers or agents of the
United States than are members of the state legislatures, when
acting as electors of federal senators, or the people of the states
when acting as electors of representatives in Congress." Congress
is empowered to determine the time of choosing the electors and
the day on which they are to give their votes, which is required to
be the same day throughout the United States, but otherwise the
power and jurisdiction of the State is exclusive, with the excep-
tion of the provisions as to the number of electors and the in-
eligibility of certain persons, so framed that Congressional and
federal influence might be excluded.267
Since the states possess absolute powers over the manner of
appointing electors, it is argued that Congress may not interfere
with the elections for electors when elections are designated as
the manner of appointing electors.261 Congress has no power to
abolish or regulate qualifications or voting requirements in these
elections. Moreover, in support of such a conclusion is the fact that
the provisions in the Constitution pertaining to qualifications refer
only to elections for Senators and Representatives. Insofar as these
provisions limit the action of the states or provide any power to
Congress, they do not correspondingly limit or provide power in
Presidential elections. Congress may not, therefore, abolish the
poll tax requirement in Presidential elections.
It also follows from the absolute powers premise that Congress
has no power to regulate the manner or method of holding the
elections for Presidential electors, and no power to prevent perni-
cious political activities in these elections. Bolstering this conclu-
sion is the fact that section 4 of article I grants to Congress power
only to regulate the "time, places, and manner" of holding elec-
tions for Representatives and Senators.109
Furthermore, it follows from the exclusive powers premise
that voters have no constitutional right to vote for Presidential
165. 146 U. S. 1 (1892).
166. 134 U. S. 377 (1890).
167. 146 U. S. 1, 35 (1892).
168. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on
S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1942), 90 Cong. Rec. 4248 (1944), Sen.
Rep. No. 1225 on H.R. 29, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1948).
169. 78 Cong. Rec. 8146 (1942), Hearings before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Judiciary on S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 396 (1942).
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electors. The states need not even designate popular elections as
the manner of appointing electors, voters need not have an oppor-
tunity to exercise the franchise in the appointment of electors.'
The right to vote which is a national function, a privilege or un-
munity of national citizenship, and a right protected by the neces-
sary and proper clause is the right of voters qualified by the states
(to vote for the most numerous branch of the state legislature) to
vote for Representatives and Senators. Even though the poll tax
requirement abridges or denies the right to vote, Congress has
no power to abolish it in elections for Presidential electors.
In answering such arguments as those above, it must be em-
phasized that the powers of Congress over Presidential elections
are not limited to the determination of the time of choosing electors.
In Burroughs v. United States, in which the Court sustained a pro-
vision of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 regulating the
spending of money to influence the election of President or Vice
President in two or more states," '1 the Supreme Court specifically
denied that Congressional power was so limited. "-' The Court
stated that Congressional power in these elections is broad enough
to protect the office of President from impairment or destruction.
The Court expressed itself as follows
Vhile presidential electors are not officers or agents of the
federal government (In re Green, 234 U.S. 377, 379 ), they
exercise federal functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of
authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States. The
president is vested with the executive power of the nation. The
importance of his election and the vital character of its relationship
to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people can-
not be too strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power
to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from
the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to
the nation in a vital particular the power of self-protection. Coii-
gress undoubtedly possesses that power, as it possesses every other
power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of the
general government from impairment or destruction, whether
threatened by force or by corruption. 7 3
Not only has the Supreme Court indicated that Congress has
power to prevent corruption in Presidential elections and to pro-
tect in general the office of President from impairment or destruc-
170. Appointment of electors by the state legislature was the practice
followed in early American history. Rottschaefer, op. cit. supro note 48. at
401.
171. Mathews, op cit. supra note 43, at 132-33.
172. 290 U. S. 534, 544 (1934). The Court said "So narrow a vivw
of the powers of Congress in respect of the matter is without warrant
173. Ibid.
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tion, it has also indicated that the right to vote for Presidential
electors, once granted by the states, is a national right.,7 4 Oliver P.
Field, citing Ex parte Yarbrough, says that there is a national
"right to exercise freely the privilege of voting for members of
Congress and Presidential electors."' 75
The preceding cases provide a basis for concluding that the
powers of Congress over elections of Presidential electors are
broad enough to abolish the poll tax requirement. The poll tax
requirement is a source of corruption in elections at which state
officers, Representatives, Senators, and Presidential electors are
chosen." 6 Congress may choose appropriate means to remove cor-
ruption. 7 7 Abolishing the poll tax requirement is a means of re-
moving corruption in the choice of Presidential electors.
Congressional power to protect the executive department from
impairment or destruction might prove broad enough to prevent
the impairment or destruction of the representative character of
the office of President. The poll tax requirement as a threat to
representative institutions on account of its preventing people
from voting may be removed for this reason.
Congressional power to prevent abridgment or denial of a
privilege or immunity of national citizenship includes the power
to prevent infringement upon the free exercise of voting for
Presidential electors. The free exercise of the franchise is infringed
upon by the poll tax requirement which is a burden, restriction, or
positive prohibition on voting for Presidential electors.
It is possible that Congress could act on the basis of the re-
publican form of government clause. Since elections are designated
as the mode of selecting Presidential electors, the disfranchisement
resulting from the poll tax requirement in Presidential elections
would constitute another manifestation of the absence of a re-
publican form of government in the poll tax states.
Finally, further constitutional justification for the abolition
of the poll tax requirement in Presidential elections might be
derived from the fact that these elections cannot violate other
174. Field, op. cit. supra note 119, at 652.
175. Ibid.
176. When Presidential electors are chosen at the same elections at
which Representatives and Senators are chosen, the powers of Congress over
Congressional elections would probably operate in practice to include jurts-
diction over the election of Presidential electors.
177 "The power of Congress to protect the election of President and
Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that
end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress"'
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 547 (1934).
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parts of the Constitution."7 Although the states are free to choose
the manner of selecting the Presidential electors, such elections
must conform to the Constitution. For example, it would be un-
constitutional for the states to discriminate on account of race or
sex in popular elections for Presidential electors. 70 It is possible,
therefore, to consider the poll tax requirement within the general
powers of Congress to protect qualified voters, to protect the right
to vote from arbitrary "qualifications" hindering or restricting the
voter.18 0
CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the national anti-poll tax bills does
not depend entirely on the merits of the arguments brought for or
against the bills. There are other factors which bear on the con-
stitutionality question and may determine what disposition the
courts will make of the legislation if it is presented to them.
The reasonable doubt doctrine is one of these factors. The
courts have said that they will declare unconstitutional only that
legislation which violates the Constitution beyond a reasonable
doubt.' 81 If there is a possibility of construing the legislation as
constitutional, the courts say they will choose that construction.
As expressed by Justice Holmes " the rule is settled that as
between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one which
would be unconstitutional and the other valid, our plain duty is
to adopt that which will save the Act."'8 2 The arguments in favor
of the constitutionality of the anti-poll tax bills and the fact that
prominent constitutional lawyers ' 83 have defended the bills indi-
cate at the very least that an interpretation upholding the legisla-
tion is possible. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the anti-poll
tax bills would be upheld by the courts on the basis of the reason-
able doubt doctrine.
The "political" question doctrine is also relevant to the consti-
178. National Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax, H.R. 7, the Anti-
Poll Tax Bill is Constitutional, 4.
179. Ibid.
180. Ibid.
181. "The courts are practically unanimous in saying that laws shall
not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear be-
yond a reasonable doubt." Dodd, Constitutional Law 36 (3(d ed. 1942)
182. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927).
183. Among leading constitutional lawyers supporting the constitution-
ality of the anti-poll tax bills are the authors of H.R. 7, the Anti-Poll Tax
Bill is Conistitutional, a pamphlet published by the National Committee to
Abolish the Poll Tax. They are: George Gordon Battle, Walton Hamilton,
Myres McDougal, Leon Greene, Robert K. Wettach, M. T Van Hecke,
Lloyd K. Garrison, Charles Bun, Walter Gelhorn and Edwin Borchard.
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tutionality of the anti-poll tax bills. The courts have resorted to
this doctrine recently and in the past .m accepting certain Con-
gressional findings as conclusive upon them and not subject to
judicial review.31 4 There is a possibility that the Supreme Court
would accept a Congressional finding to the effect that the poll tax
requirement is not a qualification for voting, that the poll tax states
no longer enjoy republican forms of government, or that the poll
tax requirement does keep qualified voters from exercising their
national right to vote." 5 If so, the anti-poll tax legislation would
most likely be sustained.
Furthermore, if the anti-poll tax bills are ever enacted into
law, the present Supreme Court is apt to adopt some approach
which will permit it to sustain the legislation. The Court may be
described as "nationalistic." Very few Congressional statutes have
been held unconstitutional since 1936 even though Congress has
expanded into fields hitherto forbidden it.lS0 Of particular im-
portance as suggestive of the temper of the Supreme Court with
regard to elections are United States v. Classic and Smith v. All-
wright s7 which overruled Newberry v. United StatesIs and
Grovey v. Townsend'8 9 respectively These decisions, in declaring
primaries to be elections within the meaning of the Constitution,
in protecting the right to vote at primaries, and in declaring "white
primaries" unconstitutional, indicate the concern of the Court in
protecting the right to vote and in adapting the Constitution to
modem suffrage conditions and problems. The decisions also would
authorize Congress to abolish the poll tax requirement in pri-
maries if it may be abolished in general elections.
It is true that the Supreme Court in 1937 in the Breedlove
case failed to find the poll tax requirement in Georgia in violation
of the national Constitution, and refused to review the Pirtle case
upholding the poll tax requirement in Tennessee m 1941.190 But
184. Kallenbach, op. cit. supra note 2, at 727, refers to this doctrine as
a possible basis for sustaining the anti-poll tax bills. See notes 141, 142 stupra.
185. Kallenbach, op. cit. supra note 2, at 727. See text sipra p. 244.
186. Kallenbach, op. cit. mpra note 2, at 727, describes the Supreme
Court since 1937 as a precedent breaking body. In Smith v. Allwright, 321
U. S. 649, 665 (1944), the majority opinion cited fourteen cases decided by
the Supreme Court since 1937 in which previous decisions had been over-
ruled.
187 321 U. S. 649 (1944).
188. 236 U. S. 232 (1921).
189. 294 U. S. 45 (1935).
190. 314 U. S. 621 (1941). It was said that the Supreme Court had to
refuse certiorari because there was not even a statement of fact or even a
record to be placed before the Court. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on judiciary on S. 1280, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 393 (1942).
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the Court did not hear the key argument against the poll tax re-
quirement, that it is not a qualification for voting. Neither did the
Court have before it a Congressional finding to the effect that the
poll tax requirement is not a qualification for voting or national
legislation on the subject in general.
It can be reasonably concluded, therefore, on the basis of the
arguments raised in favor of the constitutionality of the proposed
anti-poll tax legislation, and the other factors just described, that
the national anti-poll tax bills are constitutional.
